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1 Introduction 
One of the most persistent characteristics of the geography of Britain is the wide 
inequality that exists between its constituent regions. It is an inequality which has come 
to be known as the North-South divide, but this is a gestural term that refers to a 
geography which has in fact varied in detail and in form over at least the last two 
centuries. In the present period, in spite of many stated intentions and much government 
rhetoric to the contrary, it has on many measures grown considerably worse. Our 
argument in this paper is that it will continue to do so unless there is a more serious 
engagement with the power dynamics that underlie this fundamentally unequal and 
undemocratic geography: dynamics that continue to return London and the South East as 
the centre of the nation.  A reversal of this situation demands a good degree of radical 
thinking and political courage.  
We want to begin the fight against the spatial assumptions of most current thinking 
about the British polity, assumptions that are so familiar that they are hardly debated at 
all. One assumption we want to fight against is that London is the fount of all things 
‘political’. Lots of commentators have, of course, wanted to argue that the United 
Kingdom is rabidly London-centric. But these same commentators then demonstrate how 
mired they are in a certain way of thinking by simply replacing a state containing a 
powerful central space that does most of the politics with a whole series of clones: little 
states with their own centres and political goodies – and their own peripheries. Second, 
we want to fight against that other opposing point of view, the assumption that the 
solution to this state of affairs is local democracy. We do not believe that ‘local’ is 
automatically a good thing, not only because modern British society is now threaded 
through with all kinds of politics operating at all kinds of scales but also because not only 
can local politics be just as mean-spirited as any other kinds of political activity but also 
such localism makes much more difficult any attempt at serious redistribution between 
places. At worst, it can lead simply to inter-local competition. Third, as by now we hope 
is becoming clear, we want to fight against the idea that politics has to be territorially 
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bounded. Rather, we are interested in spaces of relation in which all kinds of unlike 
things can knock up against each other in all kinds of ways.  
One way to state our position is to say that we are interested in a mobile politics. But 
even this does not quite capture it. Rather, we are interested in critiquing a certain kind of 
mobility – the one which always passes through the capital, both in thought and deed. 
Just as the transport system, and so many other systems too, seem automatically to head 
for London, so the kind of mobility which we want to criticize also thinks that there is no 
other way of being. We want, then, to write about a different kind of mobility, one which 
doesn’t have London as its head. We want to move on into a world in which centres are 
no longer quite so important because political power has been not so much devolved 
(which still assumes the presence of a centre) as dispersed (which does not). 
Two particular threads of change are important to this reimagination of a mobile 
politics. One is the issue of the very conceptualisation of regions and “the regional 
question” in an era of increasingly geographically extended spatial flows and an 
intellectual context where space is frequently being imagined as a product of networks 
and relations, in contrast to an older topography in which territoriality was dominant. 
This raises huge questions: of what “the region” can mean in such an era and such a 
space; and of the relation both between regions and between the regional and the national 
and international. A relational understanding of space poses challenges both to the 
analysis of the causes of regional inequality and to the design of measures to combat it. 
Can one construct a relational politics to address a relational space? And how might that 
resonate with any proposed regionalisation of England, or regional devolution? 
The other thread is that while the claims for regional devolution have already linked 
the economic with the political, it is evident that the UK in general, and England 
specifically, still have highly centralised geographies of power. There is such an integral 
relation between inequalities of power and economy, and the construction of the national 
space, that we would question whether regional devolution, as currently proposed, will 
make any serious in-roads into the nationally centralised geography of power.  We firmly 
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believe that issues of regional inequality and what we call the spatial grammar of 
democracy in Britain are linked to such a degree that more radical action is needed. 
However, in arguing against the centrality of London and the South East, we are not 
making the claim that the whole of this region is wealthy or powerful. Indeed one of our 
concerns is to address the systematic production of poverty and exclusion within the 
capital itself. Nor is the notion of “region” meant to signify some kind of bounded 
territory. It is crucial to our argument that “space” (the national, and international, 
geography) is understood in terms of flows and interconnections, as well as boundaries. 
Thus “the South East”, as we would argue is any region, is a nexus of relations and 
connections, changing its geography over time as those relations change, and changing its 
distinctiveness too (ref: Rethinking the Region). For the moment let us say that something 
called “the South East” in our meaning of that term stretches discontinuously between 
extremities in Cambridge in the east and Bristol in the west and that, although there is no 
single coherent “regional economy”, there is much which ties it together, even in its 
openness. Those things which it shares include above all the central dynamic of London.  
We begin the paper by showing that the London-centrism of the British polity is 
such an enduring feature that it has now become ingrained as the template for doing 
politics. The grip of London is so strong that in the first part of the paper we are forced to 
produce a fairly extensive archaeology of its composition, before we can show the ways 
in which it continues to return, now, in a different form because of the rise of the mass 
media of the latter half of the Twentieth century. The resulting inequality is echoed in the 
way in which the politics of the regions is now conducted. In the second section, which 
considers the continuing economic power of this metropolitan area, we argue that this 
region’s grip on various dimensions of national politics and policy contributes 
significantly to regional inequality in the UK, and also perpetuates huge inequalities 
within the area itself. In the third section, we show that the various measures which are 
currently being used to ameliorate some of the most malign effects of regional inequality 
are largely ineffective because they still assume the centred spatial grammar that is at the 
root of the regional problem. Since they cannot get beyond that grammar, they cannot get 
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into policy territories which might produce an effective counterweight. So, for example, 
we argue that contemporary regional policy and institutional reforms such as 
development agencies and some of the other paraphernalia of economic devolution, are 
not equal to the task. In the final sections of the paper, we go on to develop a set of 
alternative proposals that presume neither London-centrism nor devolution. Instead, we 
make the case for a dispersed polity that has no special centre. The result is that different 
parts of the country can play equal roles in the conduct of the nation. This involves 
shipping ‘national’ institutions out of the London region, certainly, but it also means 
breaking the hold on political thought and action that London currently has, by producing 
a patchwork of different political mobilities which are able to revalorise the local by 
bringing it into a new relation with the national. We believe that the measures we outline 
will benefit not only the regions outside London, but also London itself, by removing so 
many of the strained political relationships which now characterise political life in the 
UK, and by improving the general quality of life of the metropolis and its region. 
Our stance is therefore quite straightforward. We believe that Britain cannot count 
itself as a real democracy when different parts of the country have different political 
weights attached to them. So this state of affairs must change, and this paper outlines how 
that change can be brought about, bringing say to the many parts of the country which 
currently have no say. 
2 Does politics have to be territorially defined? 
One of the conundra which encapsulates this tight relation between geography and 
power is the following: how is it that the Labour Party, in the main elected by people 
from outside London and the Southeast, should so quickly have fallen under the spell of 
London and the Southeast, so that Labour nowadays feels almost irrevocably 
metropolitan? It is easy to come up with all kinds of explanations, of course, from the 
pull of the bright lights to the personal histories of so many MPs. But, increasingly, we 
have come to the conclusion that Labour’s London-centrism was pre-ordained by a way 
of thinking about the British political space which has become so engrained in the British 
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psyche that it never occurs to anyone to think that there is a political battle to be had. 
Why might this be so? 
2.1 Towards a politics of circulation 
In this section, we argue that British political life has a distinctive spatial grammar 
which lies at the heart of the unequal distribution of power that has plagued these shores 
for so long. Indeed, since it colours nearly everything that happens in Britain – because it 
provides the spatial metric which measures out what is politically significant and what is 
politically insignificant – it may even be its heart.  
We are talking here about the divide between that very small part of London in 
which political decisions are made about the rest of the country – and the rest of the 
country. The genealogy of this divide is clear enough; it comprises elements of the old 
court and its social appendages like the season (in which aristocrats came to town for set 
periods of time) taken over into political life. It also has elements of the old 
parliamentary set-up in which executive decision was legitimated by parliament. More 
generally, it illustrates the distinctively dominant character of London in British history. 
Most countries have a capital city; few countries have a capital which has been so 
presumptively dominant for so long. Whatever the case, the upshot is clear: a remarkably 
small area of the country – no more than a few square miles at most around Westminster 
– produces most of what the country now counts as formal politics. Measure and 
measured coincide in one place.  
2.1.1 Supplicant political spaces – And how to avoid them 
London has always counted as the primary node of British political life. But, as 
many commentators have pointed out, under New Labour – a party with most of its MPs 
representing constituencies outside London, and with many of its roots in the North – that 
primacy has, if anything, increased. Why should such an apparently non-metropolitan 
party cleave to the spatial values of the old regime? 
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We want to argue that the reason for this odd state of affairs is a spatial structure 
which has been allowed continually to re-assert its will to centralisation, repeating over 
and over again what might be called a ‘courtly’ structure. The courtly structure is a 
deeply engrained set of spatial political habits, concerning where power is located and 
how it is therefore constituted, which underlies much of British political life. Indeed, we 
could go farther and argue that this courtly structure has never been able to throw off the 
imperial habits that it learnt in the days of Empire. Though the Empire has now gone, 
London’s relationship with the rest of Britain remains that of an imperial city (Driver and 
Gilbert, 1999). And our quarrel with this structure is straightforward: it is exclusionary 
(in that it casts off much of the British polity from any real chance of political influence), 
it is colonial (in that it continues to produce subaltern relationships) and it is therefore 
demeaning (in that it produces a supplicant relationship with the metropole).  
How might this situation be changed? To understand this requires a little history, 
primarily in order to show just how deeply engrained in the British political psyche this 
spatial structure is. 
2.1.2 A brief history of British Political Space 
British political space is still monarchical; that is, it is modelled on a sovereign 
political entity to which the polity pays homage in particular places, and especially some 
parts of central London. Social differentiations have tended to ossify around this 
geographical structure, providing spatial refrains that echo down the ages. Two instances 
of this ossification will suffice to make the point. One is the current class structure. 
Although that structure may have changed in some important ways, it still remains 
centred on London and this supremacist spatial structure is in turn a means of 
reproducing many constant elements of class. Thus, the British upper middle class is still 
overwhelmingly educated in and remains living within the orbit of London. Current 
patterns of class mobility only add to this brew. For example, young graduates are so 
likely to get their first job in London and the Southeast that the region is often called an 
‘escalator’ region (Fielding et al, 19xx). The available data shows that to get on still 
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means, Dick Whittington-like, having to go to London to work. And one more element 
also needs to be added in. The concentration of the British upper middle class in London 
and the Southeast is also an ethnic concentration – of white people. 
A second instance is the social round of the upper middle class, sometimes called 
‘the Season’. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the Season was the set of social 
practices through which the British upper class came together and recognized itself by 
migrating to London at a set time of the year. Lasting from the end of April to the end of 
July or the beginning of August, the Season was a series of carefully structured social 
events (Thrift, 1996) which assumed location in London and the Southeast: the main 
events of the Season like the Royal Academy Show, the presentation of debutantes at 
Court and the numerous private social functions were all located in London and forays 
outside the metropolis were rare and largely within the southeast (the Derby in early 
June, Ascot later in the month, the Eton and Harrow cricket match and the Henley 
Regatta in July). Of course, this round never quite fitted the times assigned to it: there 
was Cowes in August, hunting, shooting and fishing over the late Summer and into 
Autumn, and so on. Though the exact social make-up and events of the Season have now 
changed, it still remains, courtesy of corporate hospitality, a key means of building class 
solidarity, albeit a class of a more diffuse kind. Those who circulate through the set of 
sporting, social and cultural events that now go on all year round, are part of corporate 
elites who are able thereby to affirm their presence in the world as important. And the 
location of these events is still overwhelmingly in London and the Southeast. The very 
landscape therefore reciprocates, echoing back economic and social power. 
We would argue that the practices of democratic representation have not changed 
this situation as much as might be thought.  So, for example, when Parliament was first 
set up, it was on the basis of journeying to London1, and specific periods in which 
                                                 
1 Interestingly, of course, at various points in British history, because of the plague and similar 
events, parliament has sat outside London, showing that there is no de facto reason why London has to be 
the location for parliament. 
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Parliament would sit, a structure which still continues. Similarly, the tempo of the 
accompanying social round still has peaks and troughs which are recognizably the 
ancestors of previous times. 
But this space and time is not just a national one. There is also within London a 
space of concentrated political interaction, that space around Parliament and 
Westminster, which again echoes down to the present. So the series of salons and other 
meetings held in Victorian London has been replaced by a series of associated parties, 
receptions and meetings in restaurants held on the first four days of the week which 
constitute a potent form of power-broking in themselves, as well as a key source of social 
cohesion for the political class. This is a spatial structure of political talk which is, in the 
strongest sense, a privileged version of the world and its events and one of the key ways 
in which the ‘political’ is constituted in Britain. This point is worth expanding upon. 
The extraordinary dominance of this small space of political performance rests on 
five interlocking sets of institutions. First, nearly all the main executive instruments of 
government are located in this one small area (Figure 1), within about ten minutes walk 
of one another (Hennessy, 2001). Endlessly circulating around and paying homage to the 
presidential core of the Prime Minister’s Office, the Cabinet Office and the Treasury, this 
is a kind of political village. Indeed it is often described as such by the press. Second, this 
area also includes all kinds of ancillary institutions which nowadays are often regarded as 
a necessary part of the political process and, most especially, all the lobby companies, 
political consultancies, and press and public relations offices which since the 1970s have 
come to make up the ‘promotional culture’ of the political public relations industry 
(Miller, 2000). The concentration of these institutions is sufficient for some to argue for 
the rise of the ‘public relations state’, as typified by the person of the ‘spin doctor’ 
(Schlesinger, Miller and Dinan, 2001). Third, and hardly surprisingly, the political media 
spend very large amounts of time in the area. They have special television and radio 
studios. They have briefings by government functionaries (especially in the laddish 
atmosphere of the lobby). They have well-travelled lines of connection. The press and the 
other reporting media have an increasingly symbiotic relationship with politics through 
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this space and they are involved in a continuous set of interactions in which politicians 
attempt to control journalistic output and journalists attempt to get stories that have some 
measure of depth. Very often, this means all kinds of covert deals and dispensations 
mediated through close but calculating social relations. For example, politicians may 
have favoured journalists to whom they leak selected stories (Jones, 1995, 1999). Fourth, 
the Houses of Commons and Lords are also important sites in this space, not so much as 
legislative bodies but as clubby means of circulating and interpreting information. Fifth, 
there are the numerous institutions of general sociality through which contact is made and 
maintained; restaurants, bars, clubs, and so on. These institutions are important in their 
own right as both lubricants and means of gaining influence. 
Mobilising all these different institutions is a constant hum of talk. This talk is not 
incidental. It is constructive of what politics is; stories, gossip, rumour, unattributable 
conversations, presentational messages and battles, who knows whom, general spin.  In 
many ways, it is the elemental stuff of contemporary British politics.  
What this adds up to is a series of privileged communities/conversations, a web of 
contacts which form in and about this area and for whom the area is an enormous 
rhetorical resource. These communities constantly meet at parties, receptions, restaurants, 
in a constant round of information-gathering and dissemination. It is a small community 
(for example, there are probably no more than 300 key political journalists and 
commentators) through and by which stories are told about what is going on which 
become privileged interpretations of events since they come, so to speak, branded by 
their provenance in the area1. Fictions become firmly-based facts. There is one political-
spatial ‘brand’, a presentation of the political which is superior to all others.  
So, social interaction and political power are continually connected and continually 
reinforced by this introspective space. In turn, this connection produces a group of 
political insiders who have privileged access and knowledge. New Labour seems 
                                                 
1 If journalists and politicians want to meet secretly, they are often advised to go to restaurants 
outside Central London where they are less likely to be seen by anyone who will know them. 
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particularly prone to the tendency to perform this London-based structure of political talk 
as a privileged, inclusive mode. Indeed, it often seems to know no other land. Part of the 
reason for this is quite clearly the traumatic experience of its many years out of power 
and the consequent re-orientation to presentation and opinion polls, a re-learning of the 
art of politics which was incarnated in icons like Millbank, Alastair Campbell, data 
systems like Excalibur and so on. And part of it stems from a profound distrust of that 
which is not central, as in the case of local government (and especially, ironically, 
London local government) (Gould, 1998, Macintyre, 1999). 
Whatever the reasons, we believe that this talk machine is profoundly exclusionary; 
it is clearly semi-colonial in nature, it relates chiefly to itself and, insofar as it relates to 
other parts of the country at all, it does so chiefly as a means of bringing information 
back ‘home’. This space is a classic centre of control. For what it does is bring 
information back to the centre and re-process it. The rest of the country provides political 
events which are then commented upon. All events are described in terms of their 
relationship to this centre, rather than the other way around. And there are consequent 
rewards for insiders at the expense of 'spatially displaced' outsiders who are not ‘in the 
know’. So it is that a small number of reporters and commentators, interacting all but 
continuously with politicians and their press officers, sets the political agenda of the 
country in a feeding frenzy to which distance is never allowed to lend disenchantment. 
Yet what is remarkable is how little this machine is ever commented upon, except 
when scandals periodically erupt (at which point it is usually coded as ‘cronyism’ or 
‘spin’ which does not take into account the structural nature – including its spatial 
structure – of what is happening). It is seen as a natural state of affairs; an unproblematic 
geography. But we believe that this machine is a serious problem for a democratic 
country since it automatically decides what does and what does not matter and this 
significance is defined in terms of the concerns of a very few people in a very small 
space. And the smallness of the space reinforces the relative power of the few. It is not so 
much blind as only able to see in very particular ways.  
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Sometimes, indeed, this talk machine turns completely in on itself. Recent political 
scandals are a good example of this. They are the artefact of a media machine which talks 
only to itself and which produces many of the news items which it then devours. Press 
officers, politicians, reporters, civil servants all gather round an object which, powered up 
by a general tendency to capture all issues in the vocabulary of celebrity, can be endlessly 
and enjoyably dissected while genuine national priorities escape scrutiny (Thompson, 
2000). This is the modern version of courtly life: the rest of the country looks on (or, 
given recent surveys of interest in political events, turns away, producing a corrosive 
state of apathy and indifference) as a ‘retinue of place-persons, busybody-groups, 
quangos, advisers, think-tanks and opinion moulders’ (Nairn, 2002, p68) struts its stuff 
for the umpteenth time around and around the small same space. 
3 The Role of London and the South East in 
Regional Economic inequality 
This concentration of political power (this social and spatial constriction of the 
democratic sphere) is a crucial force in the production, in turn, of regional economic 
inequality. All too often in policy circles regional “disadvantage” is both explained and 
addressed in terms of regionally-located “inadequacies”. While there is no question that 
there are geographical differences in the potential for (current forms of) economic growth 
and in the way that that potential is mobilised, to concentrate solely on such endogenous 
factors is to ignore that relational construction of space of which we spoke at the 
beginning and which was so apparent in the preceding section’s analysis of the political. 
There are a number of elements to the argument here. 
In the first place, London is the site of economic as well as political power (and the 
two are not unconnected). Most evidently, it is the location of the City, seat of global and 
national financial power, and of weighty political and economic influence. Over the last 
half century this concentration of financial power in London has been augmented by the 
increasing locational centralisation there of the HQs of corporations in all economic 
sectors. Finally, and perhaps less often noted, London is the presumptive location of “the 
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national”. It is in this sphere that the political meets the economic meets the national 
imaginary. They are intimately intertwined, and this is part of our point. 
The North-South divide today is really one between London and the South East and 
the Rest of the country. There is no simple line which divides these realms of the country; 
and the map of power which sustains it, although persistent in its focus on London, 
nonetheless shifts historically. Since the middle of last century (perhaps more specifically 
since the 1960s) a number of historical trends have coalesced to reproduce the divide in 
somewhat changed terms. There has been the long redirection of the country’s outlook, in 
terms of physical trade, from Westwards to South Eastwards, from Atlantic to Europe. 
There has been the decline of sectors of production once central to the livelihoods of so 
many regions in the north and west (textiles, coalmining, shipbuilding, branches of 
engineering, employment in manufacturing more generally). Trends such as these are 
difficult to address, let alone reverse, and we shall not be suggesting that we could or 
should do so. There is no question, then, but that the long historical reproduction, in 
changing but persistent form, of regional inequality in this country has some of its roots 
in major historical shifts. However our argument is that these long trends have been 
acutely exacerbated by social and political forces which could have been (and could still 
be) different. The North/South divide is not just a result of “market forces”. In particular 
it is aggravated by the spatial concentration of political and economic power and 
influence into London/the South East. One of the effects of this acute spatial grammar of 
power is that much of what is commonly supposed to be “national” or “a-spatial” policy 
in fact has geographically unequal effects which persistently favour one corner of the 
nation. The reading of the country from that one corner leads to an endemic bias, and to a 
misreading of large swathes of the national polity. 
3.1 Dimensions of London bias 
First, macro-economic policy in this country is run from the South East of England. 
The perspective which guides it, the vision of the economy which informs it, and the 
lobbying voices which it most frequently and most powerfully hears, are those of London 
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and the South East. The story is a long one and one which has been often told. There has 
been the domineering influence of the City, and the relative difficulty for productive 
sectors to get their voices heard: the arguments over interest rates are a frequent reminder 
of this persistent tension within the British economy and, as is well known, it is a tension 
which has a well established geography (and one which, incidentally, belies those 
frequent assertions that London is the unproblematical “driver” of the national economy). 
The infamous “job losses in the North are a price worth paying” was only exceptional for 
being explicit. The long-term tendency has been to shut the economy down in response to 
over-heating in the South East, when large swathes of the north are barely warm. 
And the bias also runs through less obvious strands of government economic 
thinking. The current commitment to making “the knowledge economy” the centrepiece 
of so much national economic strategy is a clear example. In this case: (i) the very stress 
on this view of the economic future reflects a south eastern perspective; (ii) because of 
the capital’s “strong political and business base” there is a glaring regional divide within 
the knowledge economy (see, for instance, the Local Futures research reported in Loney, 
2001); (iii) this divide in itself further worsens North-South disparities as the brain-drain 
of graduates to London/South East accelerates; and in consequence, (iv) part of the skill-
base in regions other than the wider south east is further eroded, thus rendering future 
regeneration more difficult. 
The influence of the London/South East perspective takes other forms too. Mrs 
Thatcher’s period in office was distinguished by, among other things, a quite blatant 
admiration for some of the characteristics of (parts of) the South East (competitiveness, 
entrepreneurialism, a lack of unionisation, a certain kind of brash masculinity) in contrast 
to cultural characteristics which she despised (collectivity, a commitment to the social, 
membership of trades unions) in other regions. [See Rethinking the Region on aspects of 
this.] New Labour is not so different; it is one aspect of the dogma that there is no 
alternative; there is only one way, only one viable culture of the economy. And the view 
from London and the South East which dominates the mindsets of our supposedly 
‘national’ policymakers crops up in a thousand other minor, but symptomatic, ways as 
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well. In January of 2001 New Labour policy advisors faced public derision and a revolt 
by northern MPs at their plans to require people selling their homes to obtain a ‘seller’s 
pack’ estimated to cost between £300 and £400 to produce. This proposal was drawn up 
to stifle gazumping. The housing market in the south and east had been booming. But in 
parts of the invisible North, and areas of northern cities, where houses could barely be 
sold, gazumping was hardly the most acute of problems. This was a clear and comical 
example of what is an underlying and serious phenomenon: that macro-economic and “a-
spatial” policy in this country is run from and through the perspective of London and the 
South East. And London and the South East benefits from that. 
The same bias is evident, second, in individual investment decisions made at the 
national level. National strategies for infrastructure, perhaps most particularly rail and 
airport infrastructure, are continually made not only on (questionable) predictions of 
growth in the south east but also with the effect of further encouraging that growth. 
Current airport plans have been dubbed a massive regional policy for the south east 
(Tomaney), while transport possibilities beyond that region, such as in the Trans-Pennine 
corridor, are consistently deprioritised (Robson). In the week of his Urban Summit, a 
programme of policies for cities throughout the country, John Prescott announced four 
huge new urban areas, for the south east. (The recent confirmation of this, and its 
coupling with relatively trivial funds to rehabilitate northern housing, makes clear the 
government’s real regional priorities.) 
The Daresbury saga provides a further illustration of this bias. This involved the 
siting of a new synchrotron, a significant investment in scientific research. It was to be a 
major facility with significant employment implications and in particular for highly 
skilled professional scientific employment. Daresbury, in the North West of England, had 
the previous generation of synchrotron and the wider region still contains one of the most 
important concentrations of scientific research and expertise in the country. A decision to 
locate the new facility there would have had significant multiplier effects within the 
region, it would have retained and reinforced an internationally important regional 
concentration of scientific work, and it would have done a little to stem the current brain-
Reports/regional pamphlet,7july      16 
drain of graduates from that region to London/South East (see later). This was a major 
international venture: its location in the North West might even have changed, just a 
little, the national geography of scientific power and influence. There was a strong lobby 
and a very strong scientific case. The New Labour government decided on … Oxford. In 
the debate over a subsequent project, the cultural framework was made clear 
(Regeneration and Renewal, 05.10.2001): as local MP Louise Ellman put it: ‘The money 
invariably ends up in the South-East as that is seen as the “normal” place for science to 
be’. Her argument continued that ‘The only way to address this problem long term is to 
set up regional authorities’. Actually, we believe that something far more drastic, and 
imaginative, is needed. 
There is, then, a government assisted process whereby economy and society, 
particularly along their dimensions of power and status, are increasingly drawn into the 
ambit of London and the wider south east. 
Third, the assumption that London is the unquestioned site of “the national”, and 
thus of the majority of significant national icons, not only reflects the map of political 
power but also has significant inter-regional economic effects which go way beyond 
those which are usually cited (such as tourism). The fact that such icons are ‘national’ 
frequently means they get at least an element of ‘national’ government funding – a 
subsidy to London and the South East. And the following through of a similar logic has 
meant that Lottery funding too has gone disproportionately to this region. Thus, take just 
one example: spending on museums. Over the second half of the 1990s museum spending 
per head of population was £9.59 in the South East. In the North East of England and in 
the East Midlands it was 6p. The region receiving the second most was the North West, 
but even that only got £2.63 (report in the Guardian of research published in Cultural 
Trends; The Guardian, 19.03.01). This does not only mean that London and the South 
East get more museums. There are museums in other regions too, but they are not 
‘national’ flagships. The cultural industries are widely argued to be a key potential focus 
of urban regeneration, and regional museums are an important element of that. Regional 
museums have been pleading for more money. And yet the response has been, as the 
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report goes on to say, that ‘The gap should be filled by local authority spending’. And 
indeed local authorities have set about doing this, but once again, London and the South 
East are subsidised over the Rest of the country. 
The examples are endless. The Wembley saga for instance: the possibility of having 
England’s national football stadium outside of London, or even – better still – not having 
one at all, so that as in Germany the national team becomes peripatetic. That would be 
entirely within the spirit of our thinking here. But no, it ends up in London. 
Fourth, there is a whole host of other “general” policies which in fact fall unequally 
upon the different regions. Let us cite as just one example a tax regime with no 
progressive element at the upper end and which, in consequence, pours further money 
into the south east as a result of that region’s concentration of very high earners. 
Discussion of the recent statistics, demonstrating how the growth in incomes of the very 
highest paid has dramatically increased national inequality failed to point out that this 
inequality has a geography. And, as we shall go on to show, it is a geography which has 
serious repercussions. 
These different effects of the concentrated geography of power in the UK ensure the 
reproduction of regional inequality. The bias within economic policy and government 
expenditure decisions means that a significant element of ‘national’ policy making 
effectively functions as an unacknowledged regional policy for the south eastern part of 
England. To imply, as so much political rhetoric does, that London and the South East 
‘succeed’ somehow by their own intrinsic qualities while the other regions of the country 
are somehow inadequate and thus in need of aid through specifically directed policies is a 
gross distortion of the truth. It ignores the relational space in which these interdependent 
regions are set, and it ignores the fact that London and the South East receive massive 
regional aid: we just don’t call it that. 
Moreover, the concentration in this favoured region of City, Headquarters and 
politics both is self-reinforcing and has further sectoral implications. From business 
services to posh restaurants, to the regional bias in Research and Development and 
defence expenditure, the results are well documented. Thus the Local Futures Group 
Reports/regional pamphlet,7july      18 
research pointed to two glaring characteristics of the British economy. First that ‘the 
knowledge economy’ is overwhelmingly – as a proportion of all jobs – concentrated in 
the south east (see Figure A) and that that in itself was a response to the political and 
business dominance of the capital. And second that there is a scandalous brain drain of 
graduates to that region from the rest of the country (see Figure B) (information from 
Regeneration and Renewal, 06.07.2001). What is more, the report adds that the 
knowledge economy beyond the wider south east ‘is underpinned by the public sector’. 
The conclusion it then draws from this is however bizarre: that the public sector should 
be ‘de-institutionalised’ to be more like the private sector. The real message is far more 
serious: that it is only the public sector (through health and education for instance) which 
maintains demand for decent graduate employment in what are usually called ‘the 
regions’. (This is a point which has been recognisable since the 1960s: the narrowing of 
this element of the regional divide, especially for women, in that decade was due 
precisely to the social democratic aspects of Wilson’s policies – the expansion of the 
welfare state.) In other words, left to its own devices, but with a continuation of the south 
east bias in national policy-making, the private sector would have drained ‘the regions’ of 
even more graduates than it does now. Note, moreover, that these figures immediately 
give the lie to any argument that the north and west somehow owe their laggardly 
economic growth to a lack of home-grown skills. The point is the opposite: that the 
geography of the production of graduates is far more even across the country than is the 
geography of their employment. In the same journal, just a fortnight later, there was a 
further report, on yet another study. ‘Skills gap holds up South-East’s growth’ ran the 
headline (Regeneration and Renewal, 19.01.2001, p.11). Skills Insight’s skills and 
economic regional bulletin had revealed that skills shortages in the South East were dire. 
At its grossest, and in terms of these dimensions, the national geography of this country 
could be set to juxtapose two interacting circles: the one in London and the South East is, 
in terms of economic growth, a virtuous circle. And part of what it feeds off – and 
thereby further denudes of the possibility of growth – is the rest of the country. The 
contradictions in this situation are only rendered even more acute when Gordon Brown 
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expresses the view that regional regeneration should be led by the knowledge economy. 
In the face of all this, RDAs stand little chance of seriously addressing regional 
inequality. The only serious way to tackle the issue of regional inequality is not to adopt 
post-hoc policies of compensation but to intervene in the dynamics of its production. 
Moreover, the cycle – of course – does not stop here. For these processes in turn 
have further implications. We shall analyse some of these further ramifications (which 
are both positive and negative even for London and the South East) in greater detail 
below, but just two examples here. For small firms which own their land or property 
regionally differentiated gearing ratios on property can make it far easier in 
London/South East than elsewhere for small companies to raise new capital. Or again, 
there are the effects of regionally differentiated house prices. These bring vast capital 
gains, and thus further advantage, to some of those living in the South East, further 
feeding “the escalator effect” of that region. It further sharpens both North/South and 
national inequality (imagine a parent in Burnley buying a flat for their child newly 
admitted to London university), and, of course, it contributes to the difficulty of keeping 
London itself running. And it is to this last issue that we now turn. 
3.2 London and the South East: the most unequal region 
The forces just documented do not, however, produce a situation in which there is a 
simple conflict of interest between London/South East and the rest of the country. Indeed, 
many of them plainly have problematical repercussions within the South East itself. This 
is indeed a crucial part of our argument and we shall return to it below. For the moment 
just note that those problematical effects fall in particular in two ways. First, they are 
imposed on those within London-and-the-South-East who are not part of the wealthy or 
the power elite, those who have not got on the magic roundabout, and who thus find 
themselves, on national average wages or below, faced with a higher cost of living. (The 
Skills Insight survey quoted earlier also found that 22 per cent of the working population 
in the South East have poor literacy and numeracy skills and are unable to write to the 
standard of an eleven year old.) Second, the problematical effects of this voracious vortex 
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of growth in the South East revolve around the difficulties of social provision: the well-
known difficulties of funding an adequate public sector, and in particular of surviving on 
public-sector wages within London/South East. (Skills Insight again: the same study 
showed that skills shortages in the South East are particularly dire in the public sector, 
with vacancy levels running at 25% above the national average.) Indeed there is a case 
for arguing that the ‘problem region’ in this country is the south east, defined in the wider 
way that we have proposed. In order adequately to address ‘the regional problem’ the 
problem of the south east – the nature of its growth and the nature of its relation to the 
rest of the country – must be confronted. 
As we have already intimated inequality does not exist only between these two broad 
regions of the country. Mostly notably, from the point of view of this debate, there is both 
inequality and serious poverty within London/South East. This is the basis of some of the 
attempts to divert attention from regional issues. It is also a phenomenon frequently 
pointed to by those with political power in London (see, for instance, the current London 
Economic Strategy and Spatial Strategy [London Plan] documents). This issue therefore 
needs to be addressed head-on. First, there are of course disputes about the figures. As in 
so many cases it seems possible to aggregate them in such a way as to support virtually 
any argument about which inequality/poverty is ‘worse’. Second, though, we would 
argue that this kind of dispute is beside the point. Far more important is to examine the 
causes and nature of the poverty and inequality which does exist within London. For one 
thing is certain: that these causes are in some ways crucially different from the causes of 
poverty in the cities of the Rest of the Country. 
London is the most unequal city in the United Kingdom, and the South East is the 
most unequal region. The ‘European Spatial Development Perspective’ (European 
Commission, May 1999) in its survey of regional disparities in GDP per capita produces 
figures which demonstrate two things very clearly: first that on this measure the UK has 
the greatest degree of regional inequality and second that the main reason for this is the 
concentration of GDP per capita in London (Figure 1, p.9). In this characteristic, London 
is not unlike some other ‘World Cities’, especially in the USA. Indeed such inequality 
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has been deemed to be a classic characteristic of World City status; certainly it seems to 
be a persistent concomitant of current Anglo Saxon/neoliberal World City strategies. 
There is a structural tension which runs through the economies and societies of these 
cities. Probably the most frequently occurring sentiment in documents considering our 
capital city is that ‘it is an enormously successful city but there remain areas of 
unacceptable poverty’. One might immediately raise the obvious question of how 
‘success’ is defined: can it legitimately be said to have been achieved when such poverty 
remains? Beyond this, however, is a further point: that it is the very nature of this so-
called success which in part has entailed the production and persistence of poverty. 
The tension at the heart of London’s economy runs between those sectors at the core 
of its current status as a World City and parts of the rest of its economy, society, and 
geography. In current practice, and in the plan for London’s future currently being 
produced, the capital’s World City status hinges predominantly and quite narrowly 
around finance. But the structural dominance of finance within the city’s economy and 
geography (and, occasionally, polity) is in some ways quite problematical. Through a 
whole range of repercussions it places constraints on, and presents obstacles to, growth – 
sometimes even survival – in other parts of the economy. The most evident channel for 
this effect is the land market: a whole range of economic activities which in production 
terms alone would be perfectly viable are unable to function in London on account of the 
high cost of land/premises. Such costs affect their employees too, through housing, and 
thus potentially the cost of labour. Both companies and employees pay a variety of costs 
of congestion: in time, money and quality of life. The severe difficulty of maintaining an 
adequate public sector, not to mention a whole range of interstitial services, is endlessly 
documented. These things lead to an increase in poverty and an exacerbation of 
inequality. They mean that poverty is a different experience (living in the same city as the 
rich) than in other parts of the country. The recent report on child poverty demonstrated 
quite clearly that the high rates in inner London were a product, in large measure, of the 
knock-on effects of inequality within the capital. Or again, there are the effects on the 
labour market of the currently dominant form of London’s growth. Since 1992 virtually 
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all the increase in full-time employment in the capital has been in occupational groups 
which require a university degree or equivalent. Resident Londoners without such 
qualifications are in consequence simply by-passed: “not relevant” to the central dynamic 
of the capital’s economy. London’s inequality is thus further sharpened. The new jobs are 
partly filled by graduates pulled in from regions beyond the south east, which are as we 
have already pointed out thereby deprived of an essential ingredient for regeneration, and 
which are in consequence by unthinking government ministers chided for their supposed 
“lack of skills”. The ironies are tragic. 
In other words some of London’s problems either derive from, or are heightened by, 
the particular nature of its World-Citydom. They do not derive from people being 
excluded from its growth (the phraseology so often adopted); rather they are an integral 
part of the nature of that growth. Moreover, they are part and parcel of the processes 
which reproduce the North-South divide. 
3.3  Redistribution yes … but within London 
There follow from this a number of implications. In relation to London itself there is 
clearly a need for a strategy which at minimum would take on board a wider definition of 
what being a World City might mean (it could broaden the range of sectors included, thus 
shifting – depending on the sector – the social, economic and geographical implications). 
More boldly it could actively engage in redistributive policies within London and the 
South East. It is now generally acknowledged by those doing research on urban problems 
in this country that if what ‘the cities of the north’ need is regeneration, what London 
needs is redistribution (references: Hall, ESRC, Parkinson). Most boldly of all it could 
take a still wider remit (including the very relations which constitute it as a World City) 
and ask what it might mean to be, in this era of globalisation, a socially responsible 
World City. 
Our concern here however is the inequality between London/South East and the Rest 
of the Country. Given what has been said above, it is clearly not the case that the latter 
owes London a living. Not only, as we saw in the preceding section, does London benefit 
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from national policies, but the problems of inequality and poverty within London stem in 
part from its own dynamics. In that context, the various claims that northerners 
(Liverpool? Rotherham? Oldham?) ‘owe London money’ are simply obscene. The 
redistribution needs to be within London itself. The likes of Oldham, looking South, 
might legitimately point to the longstanding juxtaposition of ‘City’ and ‘East End’ and 
tell London to put its own house in order. 
The contradictions in this situation are enormous and multiple. The South East 
Regional Assembly has ‘warned of a crisis in services if the review [of spending 
formulae] … questions the so-called area cost adjustment which compensates south-east 
councils for the higher cost of living to the tune of £700m annually’ (Guardian, 
12.09.01). In other words the rest of the country should subsidise London for its virtuous 
circle of growth? The Evening Standard, in a hilarious editorial entitled ‘An odious 
comparison’, began with ‘It is an urban myth that Londoners are well-to-do and generally 
living high on the hog by comparison with the rest of the nation’(12.07.01), the basis for 
this being that whereas ‘Londoners may earn more than people in other parts of the 
country, their costs of living are very much greater and their quality of life is in some 
respects significantly poorer’ (it goes on to document the usual woes). ‘Very far from 
being flash and overindulged,’ it concludes ‘Londoners get a raw deal by comparison 
with the rest of Britain’. Responses might include (i) why should the rest of Britain pay 
the costs of London’s success and (ii) it would be good to see more appreciation of the 
inequality of these costs: while the worsening of the quality of life may be more or less 
equally shared, “Londoners’ higher wages” are clearly not. 
Rather than a redistribution from the North to London, what is needed is 
redistribution within London itself. Likewise, the plethora of current measures to keep 
London going (from affordable housing, to temptations for “key workers”, to London 
weighting allowances) will do nothing to deal with the structural problem. They represent 
a patch-and-mend short-term approach which will never be satisfied because it will 
constantly escalate. It cannot amount to a coherent way to run a city. Rather than 
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constantly feeding London’s growth by a succession of special measures, the underlying 
dynamic of regional inequality needs to be addressed directly.  
Indeed we would argue that London itself could be a more ‘successful’ city if it were 
set within a more regionally equal national economy. And national growth and 
productivity would be increased if there was more than one economic “driver” 
recognised and promoted within the national geography. London needs there to be a 
strong national regional policy, and a regional policy (not like those of old) which 
focuses on those dynamics (such as the concentration of power) and those sectors 
(finance, government departments, headquarters …) which are producing the tension 
within the city itself. A number of the present difficulties of London and Londoners 
would be eased were the UK economy to be more evenly spread between its regions. A 
strong regional strategy (i.e. a more nationally egalitarian one, countering the present bias 
towards London/the South East) would help relieve both pressures of congestion and the 
specific tensions of its peculiarly narrow form of World City status. The effect would, in 
particular, be to ease the pressures on non World City parts of the capital (and perhaps 
even to allow others to flourish): to reduce costs to a range of sectors of the economy; to 
dampen overheating in particular geographical areas;  to rebalance the labour market; to 
ease the threats to the cost of living and quality of life of the majority of Londoners. 
Indeed, the measures by which London claims its ‘success’ might then be broadened. If 
measures of quality of life and of distribution (equality) were included, a stronger 
regional policy could help make London a more genuinely successful city. 
4 A New Regional Policy  
A stronger and reworked regional policy is clearly needed to address the North-
South divide. But what would an alternative look like? In what follows we question the 
government’s approach to regional inequality, which requires ‘underperforming’ regions 
to compete their way out of disadvantage through bootstrapping reforms aimed at 
mobilising endogenous potential. Locally-orchestrated regional development has 
replaced nationally-orchestrated regional policy. Our argument is that this approach fails 
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to grasp that regional inequality/disadvantage is the product of a long history of 
imbalanced inter-regional relations and the profound spatial concentration of power. 
Instead, we propose a radically different approach that places strong obligations on the 
centre to disperse itself, so that the regions can themselves be effective national players 
in an economy and polity without such a strong, and colonial, geographical centre, and 
where regions can look to external connectivity too for economic regeneration. We 
propose a more relational grammar of politics. 
4.1 New Labour’s new localism 
Since coming to power in 1997, New Labour has made it clear that it has no desire to 
return to the pre-Thatcher legacy of using redistributive measures to stimulate growth in 
the less favoured regions (LFRs).  It sides with the view that the over-reliance on  
regional incentives fostered a culture of dependency in the regions and failed to 
encourage self-sustaining growth (e.g. by attracting corporations with few local ties), 
while controls on investment in the prosperous regions dampened national growth and its 
supposed ‘trickle down’ to the regions (HM Treasury, 2001). 
The approach now, very much in accordance with thinking in the OECD and 
European Commission, is to tackle regional inequality by unlocking the ‘wealth of 
regions’ through strategies that are locally-led (HM Treasury/DTI/ODPM, 2003).  The 
approach is supply-side in philosophy and, true to Third Way thinking, rooted in giving 
the regions a hand-up rather than a hand-out.  Thus, the policy emphasis is on indirect 
measures to boost local economic competitiveness, including programmes to stimulate 
innovation and learning within firms, strengthen clusters of inter-related industries, and 
upgrade the infrastructure for education, training, knowledge transfer and 
communication.  Such upgrading of the local milieu for business is expected to couple 
the growth of firms to the growth of regions, through local interdependencies and 
economies of agglomeration.  Regions have been told to plan for clusters and local 
innovation systems (DETR, 2000; DTI, 1998).  
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Once in government, thus, New Labour was quick to harness  John Smith’s original 
case for devolution on grounds of   redistributing power that had become excessively 
centralised under the Conservatives, to an economic development imperative.  The 
government established Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) as the strategic 
authority to deliver the new economic agenda.  Although the RDAs came with a 
relatively small but rapidly growing budget, their remit was powerful.  They identified 
priorities and pathways to regional prosperity, through their small, business-dominated 
Boards made up of unelected local dignitaries.  Unsurprisingly, as elite bodies that 
quickly emulate and circulate fashion, the various RDAs came up with almost identical 
regional programmes ( Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000)).  Initiatives to identify and 
strengthen local clusters of inter-related industries and local supply chains, together with 
initiatives to enhance local innovation and learning networks, appeared in the programme 
of almost every RDA in the country. 
The result has been a brave new economic localism based on the promise of local 
connectivity (in clusters and value chains, between institutions, and through local 
relations of trust and reciprocity).  The key assumption is that regions can be a basic unit 
of economic organisation and increasing local returns in a new Britain of the regions.  
There is no understanding of inter-regional relations as a source of inequality or of 
broken local economic moorings as a result of secular processes of global integration. 
The policy community has been quick to accept new academic writing arguing that 
the economics of the so-called knowledge economy favour regions that can link locally 
for competitive advantage.  The core elements of the new economy, such as continual 
learning and innovation, a rich supply of knowledge workers and entrepreneurs, and trust 
and co-operation, are seen to be supported by spatial agglomeration and local 
networking.  The latter is understood to allow firms to share costs and know-how as well 
as develop specialist expertise, while local ties of reciprocity are seen to secure inimitable 
social capital and tacit knowledge in a world of ubiquitous formal knowledge. Corporate 
prosperity and regional prosperity can thus be intertwined, as long as the institutional 
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framework for such endogenous growth – presumably including development agencies – 
is in place. 
4.2 A regionally sequestered economy? 
We believe that the new economic regionalism will fail to deliver regional equality. 
It will not address the spatial biases of national politics discussed earlier, and it will not 
stimulate endogenous growth in the regions. For the LFRs, the challenge of ‘development 
from below’ will be rather like trying to win a race on one leg (albeit with the help of a 
spanking new crutch from the Government in the form of RDAs). 
One fundamental problem is that there is little evidence to support the claim that the 
trend is towards local clustering and localised learning. A rich body of empirical research 
on the geography of business linkage is now emerging, showing, if anything, the opposite 
trend. One study of 10,000 Swedish manufacturing firms finds, for example, that the 
effect of proximity to similar or related firms upon export competitiveness is marginal: 
40–80 times smaller than the effect of access to local public goods offered by cities, and 
50–100 times smaller than the effect of scale economies on export performance 
(Malmberg, Malmberg and Lundquist, 2000).  Similar evidence from London shows that 
only 25 per cent of private-sector employment in London is in ‘businesses perceiving 
some advantage in proximity to related activities’ (Gordon and McCann, 2000: 523).  
These businesses tend to be in particular industries (eg financial and professional services 
or retailing and leisure) and in particular inner London areas (eg Soho, Covent Garden, 
City of London, City of Westminster) where clustering brings benefits such as shared 
intelligence, area reputation, and interaction potential. But for the vast  majority of firms 
agglomeration is not a significant factor for business performance, very possibly  a trend 
across the spectrum of British industry in different locations. 
Other studies question the link between local networking and business creativity.  
Yet another London study (Jones, 2000) finds very little evidence of innovation based on 
informal social ties or co-operation between local firms.  Instead, it finds that the prime 
sources for business innovation and performance are the firm’s internal know-how and 
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technological capacity and its access to external codified knowledge such as R&D and 
trade journals, competitor imitation, and client-based suggestions. Similarly, a study 
based on evidence from ten European regions (Sternberg and Arndt, 2000), finds product 
innovations to be shaped by intra-firm variables, rather than regional variables (even in a 
high-tech region such as Munich, where the metropolitan area matters, if at all, for access 
to R&D centres and highly qualified technical labour, rather than a tacit knowledge 
environment). Another study of knowledge-intensive firms in five city regions that are 
considered to be major ‘islands of innovation’ in the EU (Amsterdam, London, Paris, 
Milan and Stuttgart) finds the demanding suppliers and customers who stimulate 
innovation to be dispersed nationally and internationally (Simmie, 2001). 
Interestingly, thus, the obsession with propinquity that has characterised political 
power in Britain, seems far less necessary for business success, despite all the talk about 
clustering. The policy community is wrong to think that localisation enhances business 
efficiency and competitiveness, for there has come to exist another, distanciated, 
everyday geography of economic organisation. This is a geography of stretched corporate 
networks and flows of varying spatial reach and intensity. The history of modern 
industrial and corporate organisation, advanced transport and communications systems, 
and economic regulation (by both the state and other institutions) can be read in part as 
an attempt to free firms from the ‘tyranny of proximity’. This has enabled firms to be 
competitive by drawing on a multi-scalar asset geography that includes local labour 
markets and workplace conventions, national and international suppliers and customers, 
globally sourced finance, virtual information networks and global distribution networks, 
and knowledge gathered from local communities, national sources of research and 
education, and internationally circulated information. 
This is a heterarchical geography of organisation, with flow and global linkage built 
into the system and with corporate success tied to the ability of firms to link into and 
derive advantage from such a complex organisational field. This is the case even in 
highly localised business systems. Silicon Valley, for example, cannot be explained 
without recognition of the historical geography of US military spending on R&D, the 
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flows of migrant workers from Mexico, the expertise of software engineers in Taipei, 
Dublin and Bangalore, the presence of long supply chains and transnational firms, and 
complex global financial arrangements. The economic system thus conceptualised does 
not break down into neat parcels of territorial organisation; a world economy seen as a 
string of regional economies. 
Instead, the economies of regions are best seen as constellations of firms, markets 
and institutions locked into a wide variety of trans-local networks, with few compelling 
reasons to fold into a system of local interdependencies. This is an understanding of 
regional economies which stresses the ability to make geographical connection, to think 
outside the territory, to understand the importance of learning and adaptation in 
strengthening those abilities. Regions are places where sites within networks of different 
spatial reach overlap, consequently the extent and duration of local returns is determined 
by the position and profitability of individual firms in their respective wider circuits of 
supply and exchange, by the spill-over effects of being in the given region (eg local wage 
effects or skill transfers), and by what might be extracted from them in the form of rents 
(eg corporate taxes put to other local uses, social responsibility obligations). 
As sites within networks of varying geographical composition, regions are spaces of 
movement and circulation (of goods, technologies, knowledge, people, finance, 
information).  This too is without local guarantees, partly because the flows are not 
territorially but organisationally structured, and partly because as flows they are difficult 
to fix or stabilise.  The implication for regional policy is that serious consideration needs 
to be given to how local advantage may be derived from engagement in the economy of 
flows (e.g. by attracting international knowledge or cultural conventions or the location 
of logistics and distribution centres – see below). 
Similarly, no institutional coherence or consensus should be assumed from the 
variety of public, private and intermediate organisations that collect in a heterarchically 
constituted region. The institutional variety is an expression of the different and often 
conflicting spatial and social interests, challenging staple ideas of governance in the new 
regionalism, such as joined-up government, institutional coordination, and consensus 
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around a common regional development project. The policy implication is that attempts 
to manage the regional economy as a coherent system will falter because the institutional 
culture itself does not assume or reflect this. 
But, can these problems of endogenous growth not be tackled by regional actors 
adopting such an alternative economic approach? Even a shift of this nature will not 
tackle inter-regional inequality, for there is a second crucial problem, namely that the 
institutions of region-building (from RDAs to assemblies) have now become available to 
all regions, prosperous and disadvantaged (Morgan, 2002). British regional policy has 
changed from being a special measure for the LFRs to a tool available to all regions to 
raise their competitive potential. It is difficult to see how this change will close the 
North-South gap, since it offers neither hand-out nor hand-up to the LFRs (note the 
steady decline of regional incentives since 1979 when the Tories came into office, and 
note the progressive shift of EU regional policy coverage towards targeted areas of need, 
which leave large areas of the LFRs uncovered and also include areas in the prosperous 
regions). 
With RDAs, Government Offices, and now assemblies, available to all the regions – 
and witness the pace at which London, the South East, and the Midlands have been 
gearing up – the only game available to the LFRs will be that of survival through 
competition. In the meantime, the benefits that flow to the South from the unchallenged 
concentration of power, state resources, and state expenditure, will continue to dwarf the 
small gains made by the LFRs through the ever-diminishing and spatially targeted 
financial and tax benefits. Ironically, therefore, in the absence of significant special 
measures for the LFRs, the current momentum in Britain for devolution could end up as 
the big New Labour constitutional innovation that legitimates uneven regional 
development through the idea of a nation of multi-speed regions, each developing at its 
own pace through its own institutions, with no obligation of spatial equity upon the 
Centre  
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4.3 A new regional policy framework 
A different regional policy framework is needed, one that sees regions as part of a 
wider set of economic connections and institutional obligations. This has two important 
policy consequences. One is that local effort has to work through these broader 
connections and obligations.  The other is that there can be no simple division of 
responsibilities between national and regional institutions.   
Turning first to regional-level action, this should not focus solely on the  economics 
of endogenous growth geared solely towards boosting competitiveness, but also work 
with an economics of circulation and global linkage, that, besides, does not reduce the 
problem of capacity-building to competitiveness goals.  Three brief examples suffice to 
illustrate our argument. 
First, in the area of innovation and learning, the current policy obsession with local 
knowledge transfer (e.g. between local businesses and local universities) needs to be re-
examined. A perspective on knowledge as a mobile and relationally constituted asset of 
varied spatial reach (from the workplace to international IT and business networks), 
points in the direction of focusing on connectivity as a means of building the knowledge 
base and deciding on what works for local advantage, regardless of how ‘local’ the 
knowledge is.  Such connectivity could include international exchanges of creative 
people and ideas and school visits abroad, the offer of higher education training 
opportunities out of the region, start-up opportunities for returning graduates or investing 
in science and technology festivals, and in general a cultural fabric that sustains and 
nourishes intellectual activity and social creativity. What matters is variety and critical 
mass – attending to the regional knowledge base in a broad and non-utilitarian way, 
geared towards building expertise and excellence in schools, colleges, universities, 
research laboratories, workplaces, the media, and the public culture in general.  This is an 
act of building knowledge reserves without guarantees and without local forcings, 
recognising that the link between knowledge formation and economic returns is non-
linear and unpredictable, but that distributed plenitude improves the selection 
environment for innovation. 
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Secondly, in the area of direct support for local businesses, an attentiveness to the 
economics of circulation might result in support for a variety of schemes that help 
businesses to boost national and international competitiveness, without assuming local 
externalities.  These could range from facilitating access to rapid distribution and 
logistics networks, international trade fairs and market intelligence on export 
opportunities and suppliers, through to making available long-term and developmental 
funding (to compensate for a profit-based and audit-based funding culture) and offering 
diverse opportunities to firms to link into wider knowledge and learning environments 
(e.g. through regional applied research laboratories and databanks).  Unlike the past, 
when regional policy did very little to extract regional benefits from inward investors1, 
these incentives could be traded for certain guarantees on business conduct, in order to 
maximise local value-added.  Instead of forcing local linkages with other firms and 
institutions that jar with the sourcing and support patterns of incoming firms, the regional 
agencies might expect firms (including inward investors) to contribute to, say, a new 
business initiatives fund, engage in community programmes, or exercise corporate social 
responsibility through profit-sharing and employee-involvement schemes.  In this way, 
corporate profits can be used for region building without assuming that corporate 
profitability depends on building intra-regional alliances. 
Third, the idea of regions as sites of circulation might at long last redirect attention 
to the reality that the bulk of regional economic transactions are related to servicing local 
demand – from meeting consumption and welfare needs to keeping people and objects on 
the move. This significantly raises the importance of demand-led regional growth and 
regeneration considerations, over the contemporary focus on growth through supply-
driven boosts to competitiveness. It forces attention on how local patterns of servicing 
demand – the unglamorous everyday that underpins vast circulations of money, profit and 
investment in the local economy – could be harnessed for local benefit. It highlights the 
                                                 
1  This problem continues to characterise regional grants in the UK, which have been recently criticised by 
the the National Audit Office (2003) and in a study undertaken by the Financial Times (Chung and 
Roberts, 2003) for their poor record on the volume and stability of job creation by inward investors, 
especially when set against the volume of grants received.  
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need to look at ways in which global supply chains can be harnessed for local advantage, 
say through local sourcing (without assuming that local sourcing naturally follows from 
clustering), tax revenue or employment standards for retailers, as it does the need to focus 
on circuits of provision that could draw on local resources, for example, in the welfare 
economy, the social economy, farmers’ markets, local exchange schemes, second-hand 
markets, social needs-led regeneration (see Amin, Massey and Thrift, 2000, for a fuller 
discussion in the context of urban regeneration). 
Turning to national-level action, it is clear that no re-imagination of regional 
economic strategy will succeed without sustained action from the Centre to combat 
regional inequality and the London-bias of the national policy framework. The 
heterarchic economy has its own political economy that rewards the actors who control 
the networked economy and those sites which originate or transmit the global flows, 
knowledge, and creativity. Nothing has changed to suggest that uneven development is 
no longer a feature of the economic system; inequalities in and between relational 
networks continue to map onto existing regional patterns of inequality. 
This means that a government committed to a one nation economics has the 
obligation to secure a national policy frame that works for the regions. And importantly, 
the case for a new politics of regional attention must not be seen – as both the Tories and 
New Labour have tended to – as an act of ‘redistribution’ from a centre that is held 
rightfully to own the resource or as a concession from a ‘governing’ centre to a 
‘supplicant’ or ‘deserving’ periphery that must show gratitude and become less slothful 
in the process. Instead, it must be seen as a way of mobilising the nation’s full spectrum 
of resources, developing a varied and distributed national economic base, reducing the 
cost to the whole nation of regional inequality and over-heating in London, and 
respecting the right of the geographical majority to earn a living and lead a decent life in 
a place of their choice. The obligation “to the regions” is a matter of the equal worth of 
all in this nation regardless of where they find themselves, not a matter of duty to citizens 
of a North routinely typecast as a victim or deficient space. 
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What this requires is a serious commitment to dispersing national economic initiative 
and institutional capacity. Drawing on the arguments of section 3, what is at minimum 
needed is a genuine, thorough, regional “audit” and subsequent adjustment where 
necessary, of all macro-economic, “national”, and nominally a-spatial policies. The 
persistent unacknowledged regional bias to the south east must be addressed. Further, the 
commonplace assumption that any obstacle to further expansion in the South will 
encourage investment blight as firms react against freedom of locational choice, must be 
resisted. There is no reason why a combination of carefully researched controls on further 
expansion in the hotspots (e.g. on new industrial build), the guarantee of an efficient 
national transport and communications network, and indirect1 incentives to nudge firms 
to locate in the North, will not work. Indeed, given the rising costs of transport 
congestion, environmental pollution, labour shortages, wage inflation, and prohibitive 
house prices in the South, the promise of the North could be welcomed by industry, and 
indeed may become necessary for further expansion of the national economy. 
Big national infrastructure projects, such as new airports, rail terminals and 
telecommunications hubs, properly linked to an advanced and integrated national 
transport and communications infrastructure, can be scattered all around this small island 
without significant ‘distance decay’ effects from the country’s most populated areas.  For 
example, in the context of the current heated debate on expanding Heathrow in 
preference for other hubs in the South such as Stanstead or Gatwick, we would argue that 
it  makes  sense to make airports in the North the new international transport gateways 
instead of forcing yet more unsustainable expansion of the South East hubs. Look at the 
possibilities that have been opened up in France by the TGV and by state-sponsored 
advanced telecommunications systems, which have brought hubs of the knowledge 
economy located in the South (eg Sofia Antipolis) and in the East (eg Grenoble) right 
into the centre of the nation’s science and technology infrastructure.  And we mean 
national connectivity, not simply connectivity with London (or Paris, in the case of 
                                                 
1 Direct financial incentives continue to attract investors whole commitment to job generation and security 
of employment falls short of the level of  support received (National Audit Office, 2003) 
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France), because London should not be returned as the centre-point, sucking in benefits 
from a renewed national infrastructure. The transport and communications corridors 
between East and West, especially across the Pennines, together with those within the 
regions are in a parlous state and need upgrading (as recognised by EU regional funding 
which has become a major source of infrastructural improvement in the LFRs). This will 
make for a distributed economy, as mobility and contact within and between regions, 
without the pressure to go through, or to, London, becomes possible. 
The naturalised assumption that London’s growth is good for the nation must be 
displaced by the idea that the development of the regions is better for the nation and 
better for London.  Nothing short of this will tackle the regional question. And, yes, this 
does mean special measures for the regions, but these  need not be that far from what is 
already in place (although one exception, given earlier arguments, is that controls on how 
freely financial incentives are offered should be tightened). One possibility is an 
extension to the whole of the North of the community investment tax, which offers fiscal 
incentives for inner city trade, or of neighbourhood regeneration schemes which include 
incentives such as access to better finance for firms located in deprived neighbourhoods. 
Another possibility is to reduce sales taxes for firms based in the North, especially 
struggling smaller firms and manufacturing firms which remain a staple source of 
employment but which have been very badly affected by high interest rates. Over the 
years, the spatial remit of urban and regional policy has narrowed more and more, 
towards small and ultimately stigmatised deprived communities. There should be a 
“national” approach to the regional economy. One serious danger of the current 
combination of devolution with an endogenous growth theory approach to uneven 
development is that regions will end up both competing with and duplicating each other. 
A science park, or some such, in every part of the country. The result could be that 
London and the South East “win” even more conclusively than they do now. Rather, 
what might be better for all regions is a national-level strategy for the economy, 
negotiated perhaps through a Council of the Regions, in which major investment 
decisions with critical mass could underpin significant sectoral initiatives. Thus, in a nice 
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reversal of Daresbury, the North West might become the focus of major national 
scientific investment; Leeds might be favoured for finance; and so on. It is only with 
initiatives of this weight and significance that the current geographical imbalance can be 
countered. Whatever the particular solution chosen, it is clear that without serious and 
sustained government action to disperse national industrial effort, a revitalisation of the 
private sector in the North will remain all the more difficult.   
Beyond regional incentives, an economics of dispersal aimed at serving the national 
interest, should include government and the public sector. This makes political sense, as 
we argue in the last section, but it also makes economic sense as an arm of a renewed 
regional policy. Unlike previous attempts, such relocation should do more than transfer 
only back-office jobs or non-strategic functions in an otherwise London-centred 
bureaucracy. The local effects of such decentralisation were limited not only because 
only lower grade activities tended to be transferred while control and power remained in 
London, but also because the rationale remained that of giving ‘manageable’ chunks of a 
national division of labour to the regions, instead of the entire national remit and 
responsibility. Now, the logic should be that of relocating entire ministries to the North, 
as well as the civil service, the judiciary, national bodies such as the Arts Council, and 
the Learned Academies and the Research Councils. 
The geography of research funding in England is highly skewed, partly in 
consequence of the London-centrism of the relevant public bodies.  The main grant 
awarding institutions, including the Research Councils, Office of Science and 
Technology, and the Higher Education Funding Council of England, are based in the 
South, and the distribution of expenditure to Northern Universities is disproportionately 
small. The centres of national excellence, so vital for success in the so-called knowledge 
economy, are primarily in the greater South East. The relocation of the grant awarding 
institutions, coupled to explicit regionalisation of their expenditure in an effort to create 
centres of national excellence around the country, would considerably strengthen the 
hand of individual regions in meeting the challenge of building a critical mass of 
knowledge resources along the lines discussed above. 
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The use of regional policy to disperse state and public institutions can achieve two 
significant economic impacts. First, it would give the regions the cachet, institutional 
resources, the fixed and recurrent investment, and the full range of skills, competences, 
and knowledge and learning capabilities that goes with the stewardship of a national 
resource. The regions would secure not only security of employment and income in 
particular areas of national significance, but also access to the range of resources, 
capabilities and knowledge in related chains of activity. Second, it would provide as 
strong a signal as any that the national economy can work as the amalgam of many sites 
of specialisation, with ‘even’ the regions of the North capable of carrying a distinctive 
role in the national and international division of labour. 
To summarise, a reconsideration of the geography of the national economy signals 
multiple geographies of organisation and flow that transcend and disrupt regional 
territorial boundaries. Current regional policy thought and practice seeks to perfect the 
economics of sequestered growth, and because of this it will fail to reduce regional 
inequality.  Our alternative rejects the assumption that regional failure is a regional 
problem and recommends a less sequestered economic regionalism and a strengthened 
national commitment to decentre the economy. 
5 A dispersed polity 
The new economic regionalism will not be effective without a serious attack on the 
highly centralised geography of power in Britain. So what can be done about this state of 
less and less affairs that goes with more and more concentration? Our first argument is 
that we need to move towards a politics of circulation. We need a radical attack on the 
centre-periphery structure of British politics. The political institutions of Britain would 
become lines on the land going to the people, rather than the people coming to them as 
supplicant. The space of the imperium would finally melt away. 
Such a change requires more than a simple devolution of powers. We welcome 
almost any attack on the extreme centralism of British political life but there is a sense in 
which devolution, welcome though it might be, is a part of the problem as much as it is a 
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solution (more on this below). Not only do the levels of devolution proposed in the White 
Paper, Your Region, Your Choice mean that regions will still have no revenue-raising 
powers1 and no control over health, education, police or transport2 but, more importantly, 
devolution simply reproduces at another scale the hierarchical spatial relationship which 
has so bedevilled British politics. As Morgan (2002) has pointed out there is no 
automatic relationship between devolution and more democracy, and if the present 
reforms ends up creating a new level of bureaucracy and professional political class, 
without breaking out of the political forms that have produced apathy, disaffection and 
distrust among the electorate, then the chance of a new democratic opening will have 
been missed. 
The changes in the nature of British political space that we advocate would need to 
be much more far-reaching than just devolution, therefore, and would demand at least 
three moves. The first necessary step in tackling the legacy of London rule is a 
comprehensive relocation of national public institutions to the regions, so that cities such 
as Manchester, Liverpool, Newcastle, Sheffield and Leeds too can conduct national 
affairs and gain from the benefits that follow. Of course, the most bold gesture, along the 
lines recently suggested by Paul Barker (2002), would be to shift the nation’s political 
capital out of London, perhaps by relocating  Parliament and “Westminster”, together 
with the vast government-controlled political and media machinery that surrounds them, 
to Middlesbrough for a period, and then to Liverpool, perhaps even share premises with 
regional assemblies to minimise the cost of moving government around. The impact of 
this step on the national imaginary would be breathtaking (in every sense!). But, perhaps, 
this is a utopia that will flounder upon the very hard rock of in-built cultural inertia 
towards London’s claim as political capital. 
But, the prospect of “Whitehall” in the regions is more realistic.  Historical 
precedent (eg the DSS to Newcastle, the DVLC to Swansea) does lend its weight to the 
                                                 
1  Although, there seems to be growing momentum in this direction. 
2 To compensate, they will have ‘significant strategic responsibilities’, whatever they might be. 
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suggestion that whole Government Departments and whole sections of the civil service 
should be dispersed to cities around the country to carry out national duties from these 
cities. They might even be expected to help in regional regeneration. This could see the 
location of DEFRA in Carlisle or Exeter, working on national food and environmental 
standards, as well as local rural generation, of the Home Office in Birmingham or 
Leicester to signal and work for the multicultural nation, of the Department for 
International Development or the Ministry of Defence in Portsmouth or Plymouth, also 
entrusted to cement a new relationship of mutuality and respect between these post-
colonial ports and the world’s South. The possibilities are many, associated with the 
presence of new national responsibilities, top jobs, skill and expertise, increased demand, 
a local remit, and so on  This promises more comprehensive regional regeneration 
benefits than Gordon Brown’s gestures in thios direction towards the transfer of back 
office civil service functions to the regions.  
The same principle should be applied to the nation’s cultural institutions. Why 
automatically assume that new national museums and other cultural or sports projects 
financed by the public purse should be sited in London or its whereabouts? The Arts 
Council, the Millennium Commission, national sports stadiums, and countless other 
national bodies and projects could easily thrive at a distance from London. Many 
charities, for example, are located in the regions (eg the Rowntree foundation in York) 
and seem to be at no real disadvantage because of this. In any case, there is nothing to 
stop the new national bodies and projects that are run out of the regions opening a back 
office in London to facilitate networking in the Capital! Once the process is under way – 
the more it becomes ‘normal’ for national institutions to be located away from the Capital 
– the less need there will be to frame the debate on location in the language of centre 
versus periphery, and the less will working from the North feel like an act of banishment. 
But the decentralisation of national institutions is not enough. The second move must 
therefore be to initiate a proper stance to the spatial structure of democracy. That means, 
above all, the movement of the key institutions of representative democracy around the 
country. Parliament must come visiting, rather than vice versa. What we foresee is a 
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progress of Parliament around the towns of Britain, rather like the courtly progress of 
previous centuries. Parliament would come to exist at many sites through the year, rather 
than just London. And its business would be conducted in such a way that the public 
could actually participate in debates. So, for example, we would be in favour of more 
business being conducted by randomly selected citizen juries who were given time to 
research and reflect on salient issues. Only in this way might the grip of London-centrism 
on the geography of political commentary be loosened. 
Those who are locked into the mindset that national means London – strange though 
it sounds when put in these terms – will no doubt protest that the above proposals are 
unworkable, counter-intuitive, and potentially damaging by compromising London’s 
locational advantages. But, a small territory and a highly mobile society such as Britain 
should be able to support a dispersed polity, joined up by an affordable, rapid and 
efficient transport and communications system (yet a dream to come true). It is certainly 
a better use of the currently under-utilised natural, human and built resources within the 
regions, it can only help to highlight what is already going on in the regions as national 
achievements (note the brave decision of the new Baltic Arts Centre in Gateshead to 
reject exhibitions that have already been shown in London, or the success of the 
Commonwealth Games in Manchester), and it can only ease the pressure on a congested, 
grid-locked and costly London.  The complex geographies of a multi-centred and mobile 
society are already at work in other areas of social life: if national belonging in a 
multiethnic and multicultural Britain is increasingly capable of supporting multiple 
geographies of affiliation, and if business corporations can thrive from distributed supply 
chains and knowledge networks that no longer gather around a single site, then there is 
no reason why the state, and the public sector in general, cannot survive the test of 
serving the nation from the whole of the nation. 
Such acts of dispersal would represent a radically new way of imagining the 
spatiality of the nation; no longer the norm of a centred nation with tributary obligations, 
but the promise of a multi-nodal nation.  This amounts to a cultural shift that, within the 
regions recognises the deficiencies of supplicant politics, and within the nation at large 
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worries about the utter abnormality of national power and control so centralised in and 
near London. 
5.1 Rethinking devolution 
Serving the nation from the regions. This is the concept missing from current 
proposals on devolution. The Government’s White Paper (DTLR, 2002) on assemblies 
for the English regions builds on the Welsh and London models of regional government, 
rather than offering a watered down version, as many feared. If voted in by a region, the 
25 to 35 member assemblies will be funded by a relatively generous block grant from the 
Centre and run by a leader and cabinet, they will assume strategic responsibility for a 
region, and they will dominate institutional relations and have authority over economic 
development, planning, housing, transport, arts, tourism and sports, public health, rural 
policy and the environment. These assemblies will be far from toothless. 
Though the promise looks impressive, devolution alone will not help to tackle 
regional inequality, because it will leave untouched the spatial grammar of politics – the 
pull of London and its elite – that has sustained this inequality. It will not give the regions 
a say over national affairs (or indeed over other regions), it will not secure regionalisation 
of national institutions, it will not in itself engender a fairer allocation of national 
capabilities and resources, it will not challenge the embedded power of the South, it can 
not alone ensure better guardianship of the local economy, and it might actually divert 
attention from the imperative of a dispersed national polity (by legitimating local control 
over local affairs). Devolution’s logic of government of the regions by the regions – if 
that is all that happens – keeps intact the logic of government of national affairs from 
London. 
In that sense, the devolution reforms promise little more than tributary rule. But even 
the scope of this seems restricted. The Government expects the assemblies to meet 
declared targets, conduct business in a certain way (eg be more task-oriented than a 
normal parliamentary chamber) and work with different government bodies in the 
regions, notably the Government Offices. New Labour’s tendency to control, and the 
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much older colonial mentality to proscribe and prescribe ‘home’ rule when granted from 
the Centre, leave a strong imprint on the regional assemblies in this early stage of design. 
5.2.1 A constrained democracy  
The assemblies have been celebrated as an act of democratisation.1 They devolve the 
regional remits currently held by central government, they plan for greater transparency 
and accountability, and they displace the recent history of rule through quangos by 
decision making by elected representatives. A constant refrain of both the Government 
and the wider campaign is that devolution will bring decision making closer to the people 
of the region. But what exactly does this mean? Primarily a certain kind of representative 
government, with the emphasis firmly on strategic planning and service delivery, rather 
than a desire for widened participation and democracy as a good thing in itself. The 
Government does not want the assemblies to be genuine parliaments, that is, chambers of 
deliberation and decision-making based on political argument, clashes of principle and 
engagement with diverse publics. Instead, rather like the task forces that have proliferated 
under New Labour in organising regional economic development (Pike, 2002), they are 
intended to be small, business-like elected bodies with business-dominated concerns that 
                                                 
1 This explains why the reaction of various English regional campaigns to the proposals has been 
generally favourable. Doubts, when expressed, have concerned the depth and extent of devolution of 
powers.  So, for example, the Campaign for a North East Assembly (CNA), which has led the national 
campaign in England over a ten year period, has expressed concern about the limited provision for civic 
input into decision making, the assembly’s restricted control of regional Government Offices and other 
public bodies (e.g. the Environment Agency, Forestry Commission, English Nature), the efficacy of a small 
assembly that expects only part-time inputs from non-cabinet members, and the emphasis placed on 
economic development as an assembly priority. Curiously, these criticisms amount to a desire for 
centralisation of regional power (increased assembly power over other institutions in the region) as well as 
greater democratisation (via a demand for more assembly members and greater stakeholder input into 
assembly’s decision making processes). 
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can get on with the job of delivering outcomes that enhance regional competitiveness and 
well-being. It is an elected technocracy that is sought, not decision-making on the basis 
of vigorous debate between diverse interests within a region. 
Thus conceptualised, what is to stop the Leader and the Cabinet from becoming an 
all-powerful force in the region, as seems distinctly likely in a small and part-time 
assembly with a very small number of non-majority and non-party seats, with limited 
coverage of diverse interests in the region, and with only a consultative and advisory role 
for external bodies? What is to prevent the assembly from succumbing to the region’s 
dominant political institutions or to the power play of those with greatest lobbying 
capacity? There is little in the current proposals to show that the centrism of rule by 
London will not be replaced by another centrism, now at regional level, and in the hands 
of a small executive supported by a large machinery of old (party) ties. 
What will be  gained in the name of democracy? We believe that if assemblies come 
to pass, they must style a new way of doing politics and act as a focal point for 
confronting diverse programmes and interests thrown up in the region at large. They 
should rekindle parliamentary democracy in new ways and they should be a conduit for 
participatory democracy. This requires: 
• greater distribution of strategic and executive powers within the assembly itself, 
perhaps through specialist sub-committees composed of members from varied 
backgrounds 
• provision for a much larger cross-section of elected non-party seats (which might 
include experts) in the assembly and minority interest representation 
• active consideration of alternative proposals put together internally or by external 
bodies 
• much greater involvement of civic organisations and other interest groups in policy 
formulation (bizarrely, the White Paper asks for ideas on how the civic sector can be 
brought into the policy process, when this crucial dimension should have been 
thought through prior to publication!) 
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• considerable use of public referenda, media debate, public consultations and 
electronic or postal polling over assembly decisions and their outcomes.   
The assemblies must become precisely what the government does not want them to 
be – a talking shop and a visual space for unconstrained discussion and imagination of 
particular ways of life and particular programmes of being in the region. Only this will 
allow all possibilities to be ruled in, including such things as demands for greater 
corporate responsibility, green taxation, the economy of socially useful products, the 
thirty five hour week, workplace democracy, slow consumption, and programmes to 
combat unemployment, underemployment, low pay and poor conditions of work. What 
gets selected should be the product of what is placed in front of the assembly, the airing it 
gets within and beyond the assembly, and popular endorsement. The   instruction for 
growth, competitiveness, efficiency, and social cohesion stipulated  by the White Paper 
must be mediated through this process of deliberation, if the government is genuine about 
letting the regions shape their own future. No instruction should lurk in the background 
as the standard of the sensible adult who can castigate or ridicule the wayward child who 
opts for a programme that includes initiatives of an unexpected sort. 
Emphasising the practice of democracy also means attending to the character of 
politics beyond the assembly. Both the campaign for the regions and the White Paper 
have a lot to say about the nature of the relationship and balance of power between the 
assembly and other institutions in the region such as the local authorities, other central 
government bodies, the quangos, and civic organisations. The interest varies from 
concern with joined-up governance to judgements about who should call the shots and 
who should be answerable to whom. On the government side, the focus is on the 
perfectibility of inter-institutional relations centred around the one main elected body – 
an exercise in governmentality. Within the broader campaign for devolution, the interest 
in inter-institutional relations is animated by the desire to brook elite power, and much 
attention is paid to how the assembly might incorporate diverse interests in the region.  
Here too, possibly inevitably, the discussion of regional democracy is telescoped through 
the assembly. 
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The consequence, in both cases, is the neglect of politics beyond the assembly as 
regional democracy is reduced to the architecture of regional governance. The impression 
given is that getting the institutional parameters right will resolve the democratic deficit 
in the regions. It will not, though, for at least two reasons. First, democracy is also a 
matter of the activity of the multitude of representative organisations and associations 
that exist beyond the world of formal politics. A confident regional democracy is one that 
encourages and nourishes such civic and associational pluralism, one that goes along 
with the (creative) friction generated by the dialogue and clash of different positions 
within and between the civic and (official) political arena. An assembly – and devolution 
in general – can only be one element of a process of democratisation based on 
engagement between autonomous equals. The current obsession with devolution has 
served to sideline these crucial questions of democratic practice.  
Second, it has detracted from the vital issues of democracy related to everyday 
abuses of power and everyday inequality in the social and economic life of regions. The 
happy talk of devolution has forged the idea of a happy people, and certainly in the case 
of the debate on English regionalism, discussion of how everyday unhappiness will be 
tackled through devolution has been thin. But this omission cannot be excused, because 
in the end the test of devolution will lie in whether it can deliver better standards for 
those living in a region. If after devolution a public continues to complain that there is 
better air quality, working and living standards, educational opportunities, public and 
welfare services elsewhere, what difference will devolution have made? Put differently, 
at the very least devolution ought to be able to deliver a better deal to those who have 
materially suffered most from centralised power (both within the region and in the 
country at large).  
To summarise, we are not against devolution in its own right, but against its use as a 
tool of bureaucratic efficiency and elite power, which is what the current proposals 
amount to.  We also believe that it will simply place the politics of centre and periphery 
on a different register, by allowing the bigger and more general affairs of the nation to be 
resolved elsewhere and by reducing pressure on the state itself to resolve the regional 
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problem (devolution can be blamed for regional failure). Regional devolution does not 
remove the need for regional policy. Devolution has sidetracked the need to find ways of 
dispersing the nation and state power and of extending democracy throughout the fabric 
of British society in every available spatial and institutional configuration. 
5.2.2 A mobile regional heritage 
A final word on the politics of cultural arguments for regionalism.  Devolution has 
been seen by its advocates as an opportunity to rekindle regional pride and to restore an 
important dimension of belonging alleged to have been lost in a world of larger and 
increasingly impersonal orders of affiliation and identity formation.  Although in the 
main the campaign for English regions has been careful to avoid the language of 
nostalgia and cultural closure, in regions such as the North East and South West 
considerable effort has gone into fashioning a history of ‘pre-colonial’ autonomy and 
distinctive civic or folk traditions. We have no argument against the celebration of 
regional traditions, but we believe it is dangerous to ground arguments for regional 
citizenship in appeals to regional cultural identity. 
At the most basic level, it is simply wrong to assume – which is what the argument 
amounts to – that only London and a small number of other large cities have become sites 
of multiple identities and cosmopolitan affiliation, while the regions remain rooted to 
tradition and local vernacular, in regional culture. Spatial mobility and cultural hybridity 
become the norm pretty much everywhere (admittedly in varying degrees for different 
classes, generations, and ethnies) as a consequence of travel, education, consumption, 
media engagement, the internet, global cultural integration, and so on. The result is that 
the identities and affiliations of people, wherever they live, are becoming multiple and 
mixed (regardless of what people say about themselves against others). Yes, even the 
North East has its share of cosmopolitans, minority ethnic groups with strong diaspora 
affiliations, people with no particular attachment to the region’s cultural history, practices 
forged in a global cultural habitat (from music to food and media), and a myriad of 
cultures and political affiliations that are not reducible to the local. 
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Regional cultures too, therefore, must be seen as heterogeneous and constantly 
evolving. They are not cast in aspic, but constantly made and remade through new 
influences and mixes.  This is precisely why newcomers and new influences have as 
strong a right as old timers and old traditions to shape and claim a regional culture. A 
politics of regional belonging has to work with this cultural momentum, which is why it 
is wrong to draw on regional cultural heritage as a basis for deciding who counts. 
Regional citizenship should not be reduced to regional cultural identification. It must 
avoid even the hint of making people who do not identify with an imagined regional 
identity feel like outsiders, misfits, secondary citizens. It should not eclipse other 
everyday geographies of affiliation and identification, such as participation in 
transnational networks, national politics, global organisations and movements, the 
politics of the ether. 
This alternative cultural imaginary points towards a cosmopolitan regionalism, not a 
regionalism of roots and indigeneity; one that draws upon an open sense of place and a 
politics of local and translocal engagement. As such, it normalises all in a region to claim 
the region, to participate in it, to shape its identity claims, jettisoning once and for all a 
politics of regional fixture based on the privileged demands of majorities, elites, old 
timers, those with local pedigree.  Such an opening would rule in, as a regional question, 
also a politics of attention to the needs and rights of migrants, immigrants, itinerants, 
commuters, asylum seekers, families relying on remittances, the mobile in general who 
somehow seem to have been displaced, as belonging to some other space, in current 
devolution talk.   
This way of imagining regional culture replaces the politics of territorial 
confinement that has come to dominate current debate on regionalism by a politics of 
connectivity based on the acceptance of regions as sites where diversity and difference 
are juxtaposed and where flows and networks of different spatial reach overlap. The 
reality that nodal connectivity with the rest of the world and its affairs is what makes a 
region should be reflected in the remit of regional politics, to include the right to manage 
national affairs, to influence what goes on elsewhere in the country, to allow others 
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elsewhere to buy into a regional programme if they empathise with it, to draw on 
experience gained from engagement in national and global struggles (where, for example, 
is there any talk of devolution tapping deep into the global expertise of local sites of 
varied international organisations and social movements?). This is a regional politics of 
global engagement for local benefit, a politics of empowerment without guarantees; a far 
cry from a politics of assemblies drawing on local experts and local sentiment to manage 
local affairs. 
The obvious question that critics might ask of this vision of regional politics is what 
remains of local commitment. Our answer is an awful lot, but not the ethos of local 
community or cultural bonding that seems never far from the surface in current demands 
for devolution. What “remains” (and what stands to be created) is an ethos of local care 
based around the everyday and the lived material, of concern over the challenges of 
proximity between strangers, and of the quality of life in a place that structures so much 
of daily life. This is a regionalism of open debate, civic involvement, and yes, also 
Assembly discussions that address the gains and pitfalls of living in a region, from issues 
concerning the quality of the environment, housing conditions, welfare and transport, to 
those related to inter-ethnic and inter-cultural dialogue, the quality of the public sphere, 
the rights of residents and citizens, and the quality of public spaces. 
The regional question goes far beyond the little concessions on offer in the current 
debate on devolution and region-building. Indeed, in the absence of both a systematic 
attack on the spatial concentration of power and a radical re-imagination of the nature of 
regions, the concessions will amount to little more than a pin-prick in tackling the 
alarming regional inequality and political centrism that currently exists in Britain. 
6 Conclusion 
Two themes are fundamental to all our arguments here. One is that in this age of 
geographical connectivity and flow we have to move away from a narrowly territorial 
view of the nation and its regions. Thinking the national space “relationally” means it is 
impossible to accept simple notions of regional economies, to accept tempting theories of 
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local clustering, or to work with inward-looking imaginaries of regional identity. The 
world is not like that. Thinking space relationally also makes it impossible seriously to 
pretend that the fate of regions, or their relative “performance”, is somehow autonomous 
to each. The regions of the country are deeply interconnected. We need to think in terms 
of interregional relations. Which leads to our second theme, which is that these 
interregional relations are economic, cultural, social, and political, and any serious 
attempt to address the gross geographical inequalities in this country has to work with all 
these instances of power. Crucially we need to rework the relational geography of 
politics. 
In the end, the problem is one of valuing all equally. Modern democracies are getting 
better at providing solutions to certain aspects of this problem. But on other aspects (eg 
economic justice), it is possible to argue that they are farther away than ever. There have 
been some recent assessments. David Walker has presented a critique of the new localism 
– In praise of centralism (2002). We too have argued that localism is inadequate and may 
lead only to competition and further inequality. But the disenchantment with the centre, 
which is at the root of the new localism, is a response to the current nature of that 
“centre”. But, taking Walker’s argument a step further, we are not arguing for a 
redistributive centre, but for a wholly  different geography of the national, which is not so 
spatially confined, that is, for a dispersed centre rather than a spatial centreAgain, David 
Beetham and colleagues have produced an assessment of Democracy under Blair (2002). 
But we would add to their proposals a much more radical approach to the geography of 
democracy and how we think about it. In particular, we have tried to show how the 
democratic options of the United Kingdom are hemmed in by a spatial structure which 
automatically invests certain citizens with a political voice which few others can have 
unless they are willing to join the London court and bow to its demands. It is time finally 
to get rid of the spatial relics of monarchy. The nation does not need to speak from one 
place. 
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